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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-PRETEXT IN A STATE OF
CONFUSION-THE ARKANSAS SUPREME COURT TAKES A STAND ON
PRETEXTUAL ARRESTS. State v. Sullivan, 340 Ark. 315, 11 S.W.3d 526,
supplemental op. on denial ofreh 'g, 340 Ark. 318A, 16 S.W.3d 551
(2000), pet. for cert. filed, 69 U.S.L.W. 3157 (U.S. Aug. 16, 2000)
(No. 00-262).
Four things belong to a judge: to hear courteously; to answer wisely; to
consider soberly; and to decide impartially.'
i. INTRODUCTION
Few contemporary Fourth Amendment problems present courts
with a dilemma knottier than pretextual seizures.2 Although courts have
imposed a legal compromise to settle the conflicting interests of the
individual and law enforcement, these stops and arrests endanger that
fragile balance by exposing the complex tangle at its root. Further, the
law governing these seizures may encourage an unconstitutional focus
on race- and class-based biases.4 The recent State v. Sullivan decision,
challenged the Arkansas Supreme Court to take a fresh look at
pretextual arrests, presenting the first occasion to reconsider the issue
after a widespread change in the law prompted by the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Whren v. United States.6 The court had the
I. Arkansas Judiciary Home Page (visited Aug. 14,2000) <http://courts.state.ar.us/>
(quoting AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY, HANDBOOK FOR JUDGES (1961)).
2. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 814 (1996) (acknowledging the
evidentiary difficulty ofdetermining an officer's subjective intent); Hines v. State, 289
Ark. 50, 55, 709 S.W.2d 65, 68 (1986) ("Claims of pretextual arrest raise a unique
problem in the law."). A pretextual seizure, in this context, is -[an officer's] use of a
traffic infraction as a subterfuge to... investigate... an unrelated matter." See People
v. Robinson, No. 06632, 2000 WL 893383, at *2 (N.Y. App. Div. July 6, 2000).
3. See Whren, 517 U.S. at 816-17 (discussing the balancing of governmental and
societal interests implicated by the Fourth Amendment).
4. See Phyllis W. Beck & Patricia A. Daly, State Constitutional Analysis of Pretext
Stops: Racial Profiling and Public Policy Concerns, 72 TEMP. L. REV. 597 (1999)
(commenting on pretextual stops based on racial biases); JOHN WESLEY HALL, JR.,
SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 17.18, at 917 n.2 12 (3d ed. 2000) (discussing the frequent, and
possibly pretextual, stops of suspected drug couriers).
5. See State v. Sullivan, 340 Ark. 315, II S.W.3d 526, supplemental op. on denial
ofreh'g, 340 Ark. 318-A, 16 S.W.3d 551 (2000), pet. for cert. filed, 69 U.S.L.W. 3157
(U.S. Aug. 16, 2000) (No. 00-262).
6. See Whren, 517 U.S. at 813 (holding that the Fourth Amendment requires an
objective analysis of probable cause, thus the officer's subjective motivations are
irrelevant); Patricia Leary & Stephanie Rae Williams. Toward a State Constitutional
Check on Police Discretion to Patrol the Fourth Amendment's Outer Frontier: A Subjective
Test for Pretextual Seizures, 69 TEMP. L. REV. 1007, 1026 (1996) (noting that nearly all
state courts to consider the issue have followed the federal standard established by
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opportunity to join the vanguard of commentators that--disquieted at
the prospect of unchecked law enforcement-have encouraged the states
to reject Whren under their state constitutions.7 Rather than explicitly
rejecting or adopting Whren, however, the Arkansas Supreme Court
chose an ambiguous middle ground--one several of its justices have
charged will cause "considerable confusion" among those bound to
enforce the law in Arkansas."
Keeping the fact-intensive nature of the Fourth Amendment in.
mind, Part 11 of this note examines the encounter that set the Sullivan
case in motion. Next, Part Ill discusses the recent history of pretextual
seizures in Arkansas and the federal courts, focusing on the varying
standards each developed to meet the unique challenge of pretext. The
note also specifically analyzes the standard in Arkansas, closing with a
look at other states' jurisprudence in the area. Part IV then examines the
court's reasoning in Sullivan, followed by Part V's evaluation of the
holding's significance to Arkansas law. Finally, the note suggests that
the extensive implications of the Sullivan decision warrant a clarification
of its ambiguous standard.
!1. FACTS
While driving his Ford Bronco along Highway 65 in Conway,
Arkansas on the afternoon of November 18, 1998, Kenneth Andrew
Sullivan, a disabled former roofer, attracted the attention of drug
interdiction officer Joe Taylor.9 Officer Taylor, a ten-year law enforce-
ment veteran, clocked Mr. Sullivan driving 40 miles per hour in a posted
35 miles per hour zone.'" In addition to the excessive speed, Officer
Whren and its progeny).
7. See, e.g., Leary & Williams, supra note 6, at 1008. Currently, the state of
Washington stands alone in its rejection of Whren. See State v. Ladson, 979 P.2d 833,
837 (Wash. 1999). The New York Appellate Division, First Department, also rejected
Whren under state law, but recently overruled its earlier decision and expressly adopted
the Whren standard. See Robinson, 2000 WL 893383, at *6 (overruling People v.
Martinez, 667 N.Y.S.2d 247, 248 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998)); see also infra note 105 and
accompanying text.
8. See State v. Sullivan, 340 Ark. 318-A, 318-G,16 S.W.3d 551, 555 (2000)
(Glaze, J., dissenting) ("Sullivan I1").
9. See Abstract of Appellant at A-I I to A-12, A-25, A-3 1, State v. Sullivan, 340
Ark. 315, 1I S.W.3d 526(2000) (No. CR 99-1140). Officer Taylor was assigned at that
time to the narcotics section of the Conway Police Department. See id. at A-]8. He
characterized the primary duty of his position to be "findfing] dope," although it
entailed other work, such as traffic duty, on a daily basis. See id.
10. See id. at A-13.
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Taylor believed that the front "eyebrow" tint on the windshield appeared
to be more than the legal five inches in length." Consequently, Officer
Taylor decided to stop Mr. Sullivan's vehicle."
As was typical in this area,' 3 the street was heavily congested with
traffic, and Mr. Sullivan pulled into a nearby Conoco C-Stop before
Officer Taylor had turned on the cruiser's "blue lights" to stop him.'4
Officer Taylor pulled in behind Mr. Sullivan, who was then out of his
Bronco, and, informing him of the reasons for the stop, asked for his
driver's license.'5 Upon examining the license, Officer Taylor, as a
narcotics division officer, admittedly recognized the name as someone
allegedly involved in drug activity.'6 Officer Taylor testified that he did
not recognize Mr. Sullivan by sight, however, and thus, did not initially
know whom he was stopping."
Officer Taylor requested proof of registration and liability
insurance from Mr. Sullivan, who returned to his vehicle and opened the
door to retrieve the paperwork.'" Officer Taylor then noticed afoot-long
roofing hatchet' 9-which he considered a weapon-resting on the floor
between the driver's seat and the door.20 The officer maintained that he
I!. See id. at A-12; see also ARK. CODE ANN. § 27-37-306(b)(1) (Michie Supp.
1999) (regulating the length of windshield tinting, known in the industry as "eyebrow"
tinting).
12. See Abstract of Appellant at A-13, Sullivan (No. CR 99-1140).
13. See id.at A-18.
14. Seeid at A-13. A-19.
15. See id. at A-13, A-20.
16. See id. at A-19; see also State v. Sullivan, 340 Ark. 315, 317, II S.W.3d 526,
527 (2000) ("Sullivan I'). The department maintained an "intell [intelligence] file" on
Mr. Sullivan, although Officer Taylor testified that he was not aware of the existence
of the file before November 18, 1998. See Abstract of Appellant at A-1 9, Sullivan (No.
CR 99-1140). He did not explain how he recognized Mr. Sullivan's name without prior
knowledge of the file. See id.
17. See id. at A-30.
18. See Abstract of Appellant at A-13, Sullivan (No. CR 99-1140).
19. This description of the object, used at the trial level, was adopted in the
Arkansas Supreme Court's opinion. See id. at A-I to A-44; Sullivan I, 340 Ark. at 315,
11 S.W.3d at 526. During the appeal, however, Mr. Sullivan re-characterized the
object as a "hatched hammer" or "hammer/hatchet." See Brief for Appellee at 1I, State
v. Sullivan, 340 Ark. 315, 11 S.W.3d 526 (2000) (No. CR 99-1140).
20. See Abstract of Appellant at A-13 to A-14, A-20, Sullivan (No. CR 99-1140).
Officer Taylor testified that: "I considered the roofing hatchet.., to be a [knife-type]
weapon because [it was] sitting right beside him in between the driver's seat and the
door. [It was] not in [a] tool belt. There [was] no other roofing tool paraphernalia
sitting there beside it." See id. at A-25. The statute itself defines a "knife"-type weapon
as a "bladed hand instrument that is capable of inflicting serious physical injury or




did not notice that the roofing hatchet was corroded and rusting into the
carpet-a condition the Arkansas Supreme Court found
significant 2 -until he picked it up from the floor of the vehicle.22
Officer Taylor testified that after Mr. Sullivan was unable to locate
the required paperwork, he arrested Mr. Sullivan for speeding, improper
tint, no proof of registration or insurance, driving an unsafe vehicle, and
possession of a weapon-the roofing hatchet." He placed Mr. Sullivan
in the back of another officer's cruiser to transport him to the police
station24 and began an inventory search of the vehicle according to
department policy.2" Officer Taylor testified that, during the course of
the search, he discovered a black, zippered tote bag under an armrest.26
He opened the bag, and allegedly found methamphetamine, marijuana,
and assorted drug paraphernalia. 7 Subsequently, the State charged Mr.
2 1. See infra note 128 and accompanying text.
22. See Abstract of Appellant at A-20, Sullivan (No. CR 99-1140). The condition
of the hatchet became a point of contention during the hearing, as Mr. Sullivan argued
that the rust should have indicated that the item was a tool, not a weapon. See id. at A-
32. The prosecuting attorney countered that the hatchet would have been unable to rust
if regularly used as a tool. See id at A-35.
23. See id. at A-14, A-24. According to Officer Taylor, Mr. Sullivan admitted that
his speedometer cable was broken during their initial conversation. See id, at A-14.
Due to the broken speedometer, Officer Taylor considered the vehicle unsafe to drive:
"He couldn't tell what speed he was driving there." See id. at A-16 to A-17.
24. See id. at A-14. The weapons charge was a Class A misdemeanor, which
required that Mr. Sullivan be fingerprinted and photographed at the station. See id. at
A-24; see also ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-73-120(d)(2) (Michie Repl. 1997) (designating this
offense a Class A misdemeanor); ARK. CODEANN. § 12-12-1006(a) (Michie Repl. 1999)
(requiring Class A misdemeanor arrestees to be immediately processed). Mr. Sullivan
never actually left the scene, however, as the traffic was too congested for the officer
to exit the parking lot. See Abstract of Appellant at A-I5, Sullivan (No. CR 99-1140).
25. See Abstract of Appellant at A- 14, Sullivan (No. CR 99-1140); see also id. at A-
43 (reproducing the Conway Police Department's policy on inventory searches:
"[Wihenever a vehicle is... taken into the custody or control of[a department officer]
.. said officer shall inventory the passenger compartment of said vehicle .. "). An
inventory search is the post-arrest search of an impounded vehicle. See South Dakota
v. Opperman. 428 U.S. 364, 376 (1976). Neither probable cause nor a search warrant
is required if the officer conducts the inventory search according to standard
departmental regulations. See Opperman, 428 U.S. at 369; see also JOSHUA DRESSIER,
UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE §§ 16.01(A), at 233, 16.02(B), at 234 (2d ed.
1997).
26. See Abstract of Appellant at A-15, Sullivan (No. CR 99-1140).
27. See id at A-15. The bag's alleged contents were: "several bundles of
suspected methamphetamine ("meth"), a zip-lock bag with ten individually wrapped
suspected bags of meth, 27 corners of plastic bags, a small plastic container with
suspected marijuana, a zip-lock bag with bag corners inside of it, a plastic container
with two bags of suspected meth, two [additional] bags of suspected meth, a plastic
tube with white powdery residue in it, a wood handled knife with white powdery
residue on the ends, a red-colored metal plate, and a purpled [sic] colored straw." See id.
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Sullivan with three drug-related felonies, weapon possession, and
speeding;" he was never charged for his failure to provide proof of
insurance or registration.29
On March 4, 1999, Mr. Sullivan filed a motion to suppress the
drugs and drug paraphernalia, arguing that he was arrested only as a
pretext to search his vehicle for drugs." On August 2, 1999, the trial
court held a hearing on the motion, with Officer Taylor as the sole
witness, and after overnight deliberation granted Mr. Sullivan's motion
to suppress.3' Although the trial court found that Mr. Sullivan's
excessive speed justified the initial stop-and that the roofing hatchet
fit the statutory definition of a "knife"-type weapon 2-it ruled that his
subsequent arrest was motivated by Officer Taylor's suspicion of drug
activity and was thus pretextual, warranting suppression of the
evidence."
On November 12, 1999, the State filed an interlocutory appeal of
the ruling; the sole question was whether the trial court erred in
suppressing the evidence.34 On February 10, 2000, the Arkansas
Supreme Court unanimously upheld the ruling of the trial court."
28. See Sullivan 1, 340 Ark. at 316-17, 11 S.W.3d at 527; Abstract of Appellant at
A-I to A-2, Sullivan (No. CR 99-1140).
29. See Sullivan/. 340 Ark. at 317, II S.W.3d at 527; Abstract of Appellant at A-I
to A-2, Sullivan (No. CR 99-1140). The State charged Mr. Sullivan with the felonies
of possession ofmethamphetamine with intent to deliver, attempt to manufacture, and
possession of drug paraphernalia. See Sullivan 1, 340 Ark. at 316-17, 11 S.W.3d at 525.
30. See Abstract of Appellant at A-3, Sullivan (No. CR 99-1140). Evidence seized
from a defendant in violation of the Fourth Amendment is inadmissible in the
subsequent criminal trial. See DRESSLER, supra note 25, § 5.04(B). at 73: Mapp v. Ohio,
367 U.S. 643 (1961).
3 1. See Sullivan I, 340 Ark. at 317, II S.W.3d at 527. The hearing was held in the
Faulkner County Circuit Court. with the Honorable Charles E. Clawson, Jr. presiding.
See Brief for Appellant at cover, Sullivan (No. CR 99-1140).
32. See id. at A-39, A-4 1; see also supra note 20 and accompanying text.
33. See Abstract of Appellant at A-39, Sullivan (No. 99-1140). Although Officer
Taylor had testified that he "would of[sic] probably took him down to the station there
and had his vehicle towed in," even if he had not found the hatchet, the court found that
the officer chose to physically arrest Mr. Sullivan because of his knowledge of
narcotics division intelligence. See id. at A-24 to A-25, A-39. In addition, the court
found that: "[Tihe weapons charge, I think, was just added to that. And I don't believe
that in this particular instance that... was appropriate .. ." See id. at A-39 to A-40.
34. See Brief for Appellant at cover, Sullivan (No. CR 99-1140); Brief for Appellee
at 4, Sullivan (No. CR 99-1140). Originally filed with the Arkansas Court of Appeals,
the appeal was subsequently certified to the Arkansas Supreme Court. See Brief for
Appellee at 4, Sullivan (No. CR 99-1140); see also ARK. R. APP. P. CRIM. 3(a)
(designating that interlocutory appeals of trial court orders suppressing evidence, when
taken by the State, fall within the Arkansas Supreme Court's jurisdiction).
35. See Sullivan 1, 340 Ark. at 318, 11 S.W.3d at 528.
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One week after the opinion was handed down, the State filed a
Petition for Rehearing, arguing that the court had made "a significant
error of law" by its failure to analyze the appeal under controlling
precedent of the United States Supreme Court. 6 The State grounded
this argument on the United States Supreme Court's decision in Whren
v. United States," a case neither party had previously argued or cited.:
The State asserted, for the first time, that Whren "expressly eliminated
the concept of 'pretext' from Fourth Amendment analysis in cases
involving vehicle stops."39  The State further contended that the
Arkansas Supreme Court had relied upon Whren in deciding two
previous cases, and thus, according to its own precedent, had applied the
wrong standard in suppressing the evidence on the basis of pretext.'
A sharply-divided court denied rehearing on May 18, 2000.4'
Factually distinguishing Whren from the Sullivan case, the court
reiterated its previous holding, again finding the arrest pretextual under
the circumstances.42 The dissenting Justices countered that Arkansas
statutes and established case law, as well as the clear applicability of the
Whren precedent, would dictate a contrary result.4"
The following day, May 19,2000, the State filed a motion to recall
the mandate issued to the trial court, explaining that it intended to file
a petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court."
The motion not only asserted that the court had plainly erred in its
interpretation of Whren,45 but that it had seriously overstepped its
authority over the United States Constitution.' Without comment, the
36. See Petition for Rehearing at I, 4, State v. Sullivan, 340 Ark. 315, I1 S.W.3d
526 (2000) (No. CR 99-1140).
37. 517 U.S. 806 (1996). See discussion infra Part llI.B.
38. See Sullivan II, 340 Ark. at 318-D, 16 S.W.3d at 551.
39. Petition for Rehearing at 2, Sullivan (No. CR 99-1140).
40. See id. at 2-3. The petition cited Travis v. State, 331 Ark. 7, 959 S.W.2d 32
(1998), and Burris v. State, 330 Ark. 66, 954 S.W.2d 209 (1997). See id.
41. See Sullivan Ii, 340 Ark. at 318-A, 16 S.W.3d at 550. Justices Glaze, Imber,
and Smith dissented and would have granted rehearing. See id. at 318-D, 16 S.W.3d at
553 (Glaze, J., dissenting).
42. See id. at 318-C. 16 S.W.3d at 553.
43. See id. at 318-F to 318-G, 16 S.W.3d at 555 (Glaze, J., dissenting). Lamenting
the majority's failure to overturn the trial court, Justice Glaze predicted the decision
would "generate considerable confusion among the rank and file of law enforcement,
the bench, and the baralike." See id. at 318-G, 16 S.W.3d at 555 (Glaze, J., dissenting).
44. See Motion to Recall Mandate at 3, State v. Sullivan. 340 Ark. 315, II S.W.3d
526 (2000) (No. CR 99-1140). The State planned to request a summary reversal of the
decision. See id.
45. See id. at 2 ("The Court misapprehended the scope of Whren's Fourth
Amendment holding with respect to pretext, as to either a vehicle stop or an arrest.").
46. See id. at 2-3 ("The Court seems to have mistaken its power to interpret state
[Vol. 23
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Arkansas Supreme Court granted the motion to recall the mandate, and
the State filed a petition for writ of certiorari on August, 16, 2000.4"
Ill. BACKGROUND
The Fourth Amendment guarantees "[t]he right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures." '48 For nearly one hundred years, this broadly
written amendment remained "largely unexplored territory."49 The last
fifty years, however, have produced "billions of words of interpretative
text" from the United States Supreme Court and lower courts, which
make the Fourth Amendment a contradictory-and often confus-
ing-area of constitutional law.5
Much of the confusion results from the myriad of exceptions,
qualifications, and reversals peppering the landscape of the Fourth
Amendment-a consequence ofjudicial disagreement on the principles
that should govern interpretation in this area."' The inherent contradic-
tions within the body of search and seizure law have led to a pendulum-
like swing between two competing, and equally important, interests: a
free society's need for privacy versus the requirements of effective law
enforcement. 2
law more broadly than the Supreme Court interprets federal law for a power to do the
same when the Court interprets federal law."). The State also professed its confidence
that this error warranted granting of the writ and a summary reversal by the United
States Supreme Court, where the "misapplication of Whren alone" might not. See id.
at 2.
47. See Order of June 8, 2000, State v. Sullivan, 340 Ark. 315, 11 S.W.3d 526
(2000) (No. CR 99-1140),69 U.S.L.W. 3157 (U.S. Aug. 16,2000)(No. 00-262). Mr.
Sullivan's brief in opposition to the petition for certiorari contended that: (I) the
Arkansas Supreme Court's decision rested on adequate and independent state grounds;
(2) Whren was clearly distinguishable and thus, inapplicable; and (3) in the alternative,
certiorari should be granted to evaluate the case in light of Atwater v. City of Lago Vista,
195 F.3d 242 (5th Cir. 1999), cert. granted, 120 S. Ct. 2715 (June 26, 2000) (argued
Dec. 4, 2000). See Brief in Opposition, Arkansas v. Sullivan (No. 00-262) (Nov. 29,
2000) at 10-13, 17.
48. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
49. See JACOB W. LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT: A
STUDY IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 49 (1966).
50. See DRESSLER, supra note 25, § 5.0 1, at 68.
5 I. See LANDYNSKI, supra note 49, at 264.
52. See LANDYNSKI, supra note 49, at 264-65.
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A. The Problem of Pretext
The headlong collision of the law governing traffic stops with the
exceptions to the warrant requirement has created a unique Fourth
Amendment dilemma. 3 Once police have probable cause to believe a
traffic violation has occurred-no matter how minor-they may stop the
vehicle.' Once the vehicle is stopped, the circumstances that arise and
furnish probable cause to search are incalculable and "often unforesee-
able."195
As one commentator has noted: "[i]nnumerable cases involve
traffic stops ripening into something more serious." 6 For example, a
driver exiting his vehicle may appear to be armed, thereby justifying a
Terry frisk. 7 Alternatively, the officer may spot a weapon or drugs in
plain view, leading to the seizure of the contraband and the arrest of its
owner.58 In short, many commentators argue, law enforcement has
taken advantage of this interplay to target certain groups, subjecting
"suspicious" looking individuals to lengthy interrogations and,
frequently, arrests. 9 Thus, a pretextual seizure may take the form of a
53. See Wesley MacNeil Oliver, With an Evil Eye and an Unequal Hand: Pretextual
Stops and Doctrinal Remedies to Racial Profiling, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1409, 1416 (2000)
("Current law effectively permits officers to search the car of any person they observe
committing a traffic offense."). As a general matter, when the police have probable
cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred, the decision to stop a car is
reasonable. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810 (1996).
54. See Oliver, supra note 53, at 1414 ("The [pretextual stop] provides the first link
in the Fourth Amendment chain that the officer hopes will lead to the discovery of
contraband.").
55. See HALL, supra note 4, § 17.5, at 897 (quoting Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S.
42, 50-51 (1970)).
56. See id. § 17.5, at 897.
57. See HALL, supra note 4, § 17.5, at 897 (citing Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S.
106 (1977)). An officer may perform a limited search, i.e. a pat down, when he has a
reasonable suspicion that the suspect may be armed and presently dangerous. See
WAYNE LAFAVE ETAL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 3.8(e), at 249 (2d ed. 1999).
58. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996). The traffic stop is regularly
used in connection with a "drug courier profile." See HALL, supra note 4, § 17.18, at
917 n.212. After stopping a vehicle based on a "compilation of characteristics"
believed to identify a drug courier, the officer will then look for contraband in plain
view and ask questions in an attempt to form reasonable suspicion for a more thorough
search. Seeid. § 17.18, at 917-18.
59. See HALL, supra note 4, § 22.17, at 17-18. The Tenth Circuit observed:
[ln the absence of standardized police procedures that limit discretion,
whether we are simply allowed to continue on our way with a stem look,
or instead are stopped and subjected to lengthy intensive interrogation
when we forget to wear our seat belts, turns on no more than 'the state of
the digestion of any officer who stops us or, more likely, upon our
obsequiousness, the price of our automobiles, the formality of our dress,
PRETEXTUAL SEIZURES
pretextual traffic stop, in which the officer stops the car for a minor
traffic violation in order to effect an ulterior motive, or if the stop itself
was lawful, then the officer may choose to arrest the occupant on a
pretext in order to justify a thorough search of the vehicle.'
I. Pre-Whren Precedent: In Search of a Standard
Responding to the aforementioned problems, courts developed
different tests to determine whether evidence seized as a result of an
allegedly pretextual stop or arrest was admissible.6 Some courts
employed a "would have" or subjective test, in which the ultimate
question is not whether the officer had sufficient probable cause for the
stop, but whether a reasonable officer would have made the stop, absent
underlying pretext.62 The majority of courts, however, used an objective
"reasonableness" test, which requires only that the officer have
sufficient probable cause to make the initial stop.63 The United States
the shortness of our hair, or the color of our skin.'
United States v. Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512, 1516 (10th Cir. 1988), overruled by United
States v. Botero-Ospina, 71 F.3d 783 (10th Cir. 1995).
60. Whren settled the issue of pretextual stops, yet did not explicitly address the
standard for a pretextual arrest. See Whren, 517 U.S. at 808. The Eighth Circuit
recently declared it settled law that Whren's standard encompasses a pretextual arrest
as well, and analyzed the two situations identically. See United States v. Clayton, 210
F.3d 841, 844-45 (8th Cir. 2000); accord United States v. Causey, 834 F.2d 1179, 1184
(5th Cir. 1987) (en banc) (holding that the objective standard should apply, based on
pre-Whren precedent); Wilson v. State, 752 A.2d 1250, 1260 (Md. 2000) (finding no
difference in the analysis). The Arkansas Supreme Court has not yet squarely
addressed the issue, and it is unclear whether it will draw a distinction between stops
and arrests.
61. See HALL, supra note 4, § 17.21, at 923.
62. See id. § 17.2 1, at 924; See, e.g., United States v. Hernandez, 55 F.3d 443,446
(9th Cir. 1995); United States v. Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512 (10th Cir. 1988), overruled by
United States v. Botero-Ospina, 71 F.3d 783 (10th Cir. 1995); United States v. Smith,
799 F.2d 704, 708 (1 1th Cir. 1986). The "reasonable officer" test espoused by the
Whren petitioners-and unanimously rejected by the Court-is essentially identical to
the "would have" test. See Leary & Williams, supra note 6, at 1016; Whren, 517 U.S.
at 813.
63. See HALL, supra note 4, §§ 22.17, at 17, 17.21, at 924; See, e.g., United States
v. Botero-Ospina, 71 F.3d 783, 787 (10th Cir. 1995); United States v. Cummins, 920
F.2d 498,500-01 (8th Cir. 1990); United States v. Hawkins, 811 F.2d 210,215 (3d Cir.
1987). The "authorization" test is another name for the objective test. See People v.
Robinson, No. 06632, 2000 WL 893383, at *4 (N.Y. App. Div. July 6, 2000).
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Supreme Court did not directly address the issue of pretextual traffic
stops and arrests until the 1996 decision of Whren v. United States."
a. Piecemeal Federal Precedent
As early as 1932, the Supreme Court had expressed concern for the
general problem of pretext.6 However, as the early cases addressed the
problem only in dicta," the Court had no established standard for
assessing the constitutionality of a pretextual stop.67 This left only the
generally applicable objective test, often used in Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence, as a stop-gap measure.68 Casting about for a standard,
some of the lower courts relied on the objective rule,69 while others
found an objective test could not encompass an officer's "bad" motive
and suppressed the evidence."'
Although some of the lower courts did not correctly predict it, the
Supreme Court had signaled its ultimate decision on the issue in several
cases-eventually cited by the Whren Court in support of its holding.7
64. 517 U.S. 806 (1996). In 1991, Justice White implied that the Court was
avoiding the issue, citing five examples in that year alone. See Enriquez-Nevarez v.
United States, 502 U.S. 962 (1991) (White, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
65. See United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452.467 (1932) ("An arrest may not
be used as a pretext to search for evidence."). The LeJkowitz decision involved a general
exploratory search of an office, following the arrest of its occupants on a warrant for
conspiracy. See Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. at 459, 46 1.
66. See Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1, 4 (1990) ("[Aln inventory search must not be
a ruse for general rummaging in order to discover incriminating evidence."); Colorado
v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 372 (1987) ("[There has been] no showing that the police.
. acted in bad faith or for the sole purpose of investigation.") (upholding an inventory
search); New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 716-17 n.27 (1987) ("[the search did not
appear to be] a 'pretext' for obtaining evidence of... violation of... penal laws.")
(upholding an administrative search). The Whren Court distinguished each of these
cases. See Whren, 571 U.S. at 811-12; see also discussion infra Part ll.B.
67. See Enriquez-Nevarez, 502 U.S. at 962 (White, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari).
68. See Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128 (1978). In Scott, a wiretapping case,
the Court approved of an "objective assessment of an officer's actions in light of the
facts and circumstances then known to him" and "without regard to the underlying
intent or motivation of the officers involved." See id. at 136. The Court has also
applied this rule, "a sound one," in other circumstances. See LAFAVE ETAL., supra note
57, § 3.1(d), at 21 n.85 (citing Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128 (1990)).
69. See cases cited supra note 63.
70. See LAFAvE ETAL., supra note 57, § 3.1(d), at 24-25; see also cases cited supra
note 62.
71. See United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579, 584 n.3 (1983); Scott
v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138 (1978); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218,
221 n. 1, 236 (1973); Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260,266 (1973). Scott, Villamonte-
Marquez, and Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463 (1985), are sometimes known as "the
520 [Vol. 23
PRETEXTUAL SEIZURES
These cases served to illustrate that the Fourth Amendment's underlying
"reasonableness" analysis requires an objective assessment of the
totality of the circumstances.72 The clearest representation of this
approach lies in Scott v. United States,73 where the Court approved a
standard of objective reasonableness without inquiry into the officers'
subjective motivations.
b. The Standard in Arkansas: Subjective or Objective?
The Arkansas Supreme Court has consistently held that the
Arkansas Constitution's prohibition against unreasonable search and
seizure is virtually identical to the Fourth Amendment of the United
States Constitution, and thus, it should be construed analogously to
federal law in the area." As recently as 1995, the court specifically
declined to hold that the Arkansas Constitution provides greater
protection for searches and seizures than the United States
Constitution.6
Prior to the Whren decision, the Arkansas Supreme Court had
adopted a "but for" test,7 apparently identical to the more widely used
"would have" subjective test, to determine whether an arrest was
pretextual.S The test considered the circumstances of the arrest itself in
order to unearth the officer's underlying intent in effectuating the arrest:
trilogy," due to their frequent use to support an objective test. See Leary & Williams,
supra note 6, at 1010.
72. See Whren, 514 U.S. at 812-13.
73. 436 U.S. 128 (1978).
74. See id. at 138. See also supra note 68 and accompanying text.
75. See, e.g., Rainey v. Hartness, 339 Ark. 293, 300, 5 S.W.3d 410, 415 (1999);
Mullinax v. State, 327 Ark. 41,47,938 S.W.2d 801, 804-05 (1997); Stout v. State, 320
Ark. 552, 557-58. 898 S.W.2d 457, 460 (1995). The applicable constitutional
provision, with the exception of minor changes in syntax, is identical to the Fourth
Amendment. See ARK. CONST. art, II, § 15.
76. See Stout, 320 Ark. at 557, 898 S.W.2d at 460. The court attributed its
reluctance to the difficulty of balancing competing interests to provide effective rules
in automobile searches and seizures. See id., 898 S.W.2d at 460. The court noted, "Of
course, we could hold that the Arkansas Constitution provides greater protection...
but we see no reason to do so .... [T]hrough the years ... we have followed the
[United States) Supreme Court cases." See id., 898 S.W.2d at 460.
77. See Hines v. State, 289 Ark. 50, 55, 709 S.W.2d 65, 68 (1986). "[W]ould the
arrest not have occurred but for the other, typically more serious, crime." See id., 709
S.W.2d at 68. If an arrest cannot meet this test, then the court should suppress the
evidence pursuant to the exclusionary rule; if the arrest would have occurred despite
the ulterior motive, then there is no deterrent value in suppressing it. See id., 709
S.W.2d at 68.
78. See id., 709 S.W.2d at 68.
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would the arrest have occurred absent an ulterior motive?79 Signifi-
cantly, in each case presenting the issue following the 1986 adoption of
the "but for" test, the court refused to find that the seizure was
pretextual."8
Before 1986, the court had specified that the proper pretext
investigation hinged on the "arresting officer's" intent.8 ' Upon adopting
the "but for" test, the court blurred the subjectiveness of the standard by
leaving "intent" unarticulated. 2 Thus, the appropriate standard
remained unclear, as the test appeared to contemplate the more objective
analysis of a "reasonable officer" in the circumstances, but in applica-
tion, the court routinely considered the subjective motivations of the
officer involved in the case. 3 The Mings v. Stale decision" demonstrated
the confusion, as the court took a step away from its own precedent by
applying an objective test used by the Eighth Circuit. 5 Despite
implicitly overruling ten years of precedent, the Mings court did not
address the earlier cases, nor did it mention the previously-adopted "but
79. See id., 709 S.W.2d at 68; Richardson v. State, 288 Ark. 407,410, 706 S.W.2d
363, 365 (1986).
80. See Brenk v. State, 311 Ark. 579, 587, 847 S.W.2d 1, 5 (1993) (holding arrest
was not clearly pretextual in the circumstances); Weaver v. State, 305 Ark. 180, 186-
87, 806 S.W.2d 615, 619 (1991) (holding that arrest was justified by officers'
reasonable suspicion); Ray v. State, 304 Ark. 489, 495-98, 803 S.W.2d 894, 897-99
(1991) (holding arrest was not pretextual in the circumstances); Thomas v. State, 303
Ark. 210,213,795 S.W.2d 917,918 (1990); Rodriquez v. State, 299 Ark. 421,424,773
S.W.2d 821, 822 (1989). Out of these decisions, only Ray mentioned the Hines test.
See Ray, 304 Ark. at 495, 803 S.W.2d at 897. The court found pretext after applying
the Hines test only once, in a case presenting a pretextual prosecutor's subpoena. See
State v. Shepherd, 303 Ark. 447, 455, 798 S.W.2d 45, 49 (1990).
81. See Richardson, 288 Ark. at 410, 706 S.W.2d at 365. This phrasing indicates
a more subjective test than the "reasonable officer" rejected by the Whren Court. See
Whren, 517 U.S. at 814-15.
82. See Hines, 289 Ark. at 55, 709 S.W.2d at 68; see also supra note 77 and
accompanying text.
83. See Hines, 289 Ark. at 55, 709 S.W.2d at 68.
84. 318 Ark. 201, 884 S.W.2d 596 (1994). The Mings court apparently found the
stop and arrest analyses to be identical and used the terms interchangeably. See id. at
210, 884 S.W.2d at 602.
85. See Mings, 318 Ark. at 210, 884 S.W.2d at 602 (citing United States v.
Cummins, 920 F.2d 498, 501 (8th Cir. 1990) (holding that an otherwise valid stop
cannot be invalidated by the officer's suspicions of criminal activity)). The Arkansas
Court of Appeals' decision in Miller v. State, 44 Ark. App. 112, 868 S.W.2d 510 (1993),
further demonstrates the confusion over the applicable standard. In Miller, the court
concluded that the Arkansas Supreme Court had established an objective test, which
it found in accord with other recent decisions and the United States Supreme Court's
decisions. See id. at 115, 868 S.W.2d at 512. Further, it explicitly declared the test to
be that of a "reasonable officer" in the situation. See id. at 116, 868 S.W.2d at 512.
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for" test." Mings remained the last published word on the subject for the
next six years-until State v. Sullivan.87
B. The United States Supreme Court Weighs In: Whren v. United
States
In 1996, the United States Supreme Court resolved the different
standards among the lower federal courts with the unanimous Whren v.
United States decision." In Whren, plainclothes vice-squad officers
patrolling a "high crime" area passed a Nissan Pathfinder with tempo-
rary plates stopped at an intersection; two young black men were inside
it.8 9 The Nissan's driver was looking into Whren's lap as the officers
passed them.9° The officers' suspicions were aroused when the Nissan
remained stopped for an "unusually long time-more than 20 seconds,"
and then suddenly drove off at an "unreasonable" speed.9 The vehicle
soon stopped again at a traffic light, and the officers pulled up along-
side, immediately observing two large bags ofcrack cocaine through the
window, in Whren's lap.92 After arresting the occupants, the officers
also found "quantities" of illegal drugs in the vehicle. 93
The petitioners argued that the stop was pretextual, contending that
the "heavily and minutely regulated" traffic laws tempted officers to use
a minor traffic violation as means of investigating other suspicions."
Further, the petitioners asserted, officers might well use "decidedly
impermissible factors," such as race, to decide which motorists to stop.95
Thus, they urged the Court to adopt a new test for these situations:
86. See Mings, 318 Ark. at 210, 884 S.W.2d at 602.
87. An unpublished opinion from 1995, Martinez v. State, No. CR 94-729, 1995 WL
45848, at *2 (Ark. Jan. 30, 1995) (per curiam), cited the Mings standard approvingly.
See id. at *2. The court went on to deny the defendant's ineffective assistance of
counsel claim, reasoning that the defendant's attorney "could have easily concluded
that a motion to suppress based on pretext would not be successful." See id.
88. 517 U.S. 806 (1996). Justice Scalia wrote for the unanimous Court. See id.
89. See id. at 806, 810.
90. See id. at 808.
91. See id.
92. See id. at 808-09. For the purpose of an automobile stop, an officer standing
outside the vehicle may seize, without a warrant, any item both visible and immediately
recognizable as subject to seizure under the "plain view" exception to the warrant
requirement. See LAFAVE ETAL., supra note 57, § 3.7(f), at 222.
93. See id. at 809.
94. See Whren,517U.S.at8lO.
95. See id. at810.
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would a police officer, acting reasonably, have made the stop for the
reason given?'
The Court declined to adopt the test, noting that it lacked affirma-
tive support in prior law.97 In addition, the Court found that the
petitioners' test flatly contradicted repeated holdings that an officer's
motive cannot invalidate "objectively justified behavior under the
Fourth Amendment." '98 In support of this assertion, the Court marshaled
cases, albeit distinguishable on their facts, that were united in a
decidedly objective approach to officer behavior." Concluding that
these cases decisively foreclosed the petitioners' argument that the
constitutionality of a traffic stop depends on the actual motivations of
the officer involved, the Court concluded: "Subjective intentions play
no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis."'"
The petitioners urged that their proposed test was "objective,"
hinging on material deviations from usual police practices and not the
individual officer's subjective good faith.'' The Court disagreed,
finding that the test required "plumb[ing] the collective unconscious of
law enforcement" in order to determine what a reasonable officer would
have done in the circumstances. 2 Conceding that standard police
procedures could sometimes assist in an objective analysis, the Court
maintained that the petitioners' test would require "speculat[ion] about
the hypothetical reaction of a hypothetical constable-an exercise that
might be called virtual subjectivity."' 3
96. See id.
97. See id. at 811-12. The Court distinguished or dismissed the cases that the
petitioners asserted supported their approach. See id. The Court discussed Florida v.
Wells, 495 U.S. I, 4 (1990), Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 372 (1987), and New York
v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 716 n.27 (1987). See id.; see also supra note 66 and
accompanying text.
98. See Whren, 517 U.S. at 812.
99. See id. at 812-13 (citing United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579,
584 n.3 (1983); Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138 (1978); United States v.
Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 221 n. 1, 236 (1973); Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260, 266
(1973)).
100. See Whren, 517 U.S. at 813. The Court concluded, "For the run-of-the-mine
case, which this surely is, we think there is no realistic alternative to the traditional
common law rule that probable cause justifies a search and seizure." See id. at 819. In
addition, the Court agreed that the Constitution prohibits selective enforcement of the
laws based on race, yet maintained that such claims are appropriately brought under the
Equal Protection Clause, not the Fourth Amendment. See id. at 813.





C. The Reaction to Whren in the State Courts
In the aftermath of Whren, nearly every state court considering the
subject has adopted the objective test as its own standard."
Currently,' only the Washington Supreme Court has expressly rejected
Whren, based on established precedent under its state constitution.'06
Several additional state courts have distinguished Whren as inapplicable
to the facts of the cases at bar, rather than expressly rejecting it."0 7
Nevertheless, as one commentator has asserted, "the need for well-
reasoned state court rulings to protect citizens from pretext has never
been greater."'"" Much of the "vociferous" recent criticism of Whren'"
104. See Abraham Abramovsky & Jonathan I. Edelstein, Pretext Stops and Racial
Profiling After Whren v. United States: The New York and New Jersey Responses Compared,
63 ALB. L. REV. 725, 739 (2000). State v. Earl, 333 Ark. 489,970 S.W.2d 789 (1998),
has been cited as an Arkansas case approving of the Whren standard. See Abramovsky
& Edelstein, supra, at 748 n.98; see also discussion infra Part III.D and note 127. One
commentator described the states as "infected" by federal court decisions adopting an
objective standard. See Leary & Williams, supra note 6, at 1026.
105. The New York Appellate Division, First Department, had also expressly
rejected Whren, based on state constitutional precedent. See People v. Martinez, 667
N.Y.S.2d 247, 248 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998). Recently, however, the First Department
reconsidered the policy issues and overruled Martinez, holding that "we adopt and
follow the federal view." See People v. Robinson, No. 06632, 2000 WL 893383, at *6
(N.Y. App. Div. July 6,2000). In addition, the New York Court of Appeals, that state's
highest court, has never explicitly addressed the issue and the intermediate Appellate
Divisions have reacted to Whren in "widely disparate ways." See Abramovsky &
Edelstein, supra note 104, at 735, 739.
106. See Abramovsky & Edelstein, supra note 104, at 748 n.98. Washington
premised its rejection on "well established" precedent holding that its state constitution
provides broader protections against search and seizure than the United States
Constitution. See State v. Ladson, 979 P.2d 833, 837 (Wash. 1999). In particular,
Washington's constitution prohibits a person to be "disturbed... without authority of
law"; the courts have construed this prohibition to require them to "look beyond the
formal justification for the stop to the actual one." See Ladson, 979 P.2d at 837, 839.
107. See State v. Varnado, 582 N.W.2d 886, 893 (Minn. 1998) (distinguishing
Whren's facts from a pretextual frisk lacking probable cause); State v. Holmes, 569
N.W.2d 181, 185, 187 (Minn. 1997) (distinguishing Whren's facts from a pretextual
inventory search following an impermissible Terry stop for a parking violation); State
v. Gonzalez-Gutierrez, 927 P.2d 776, 778-79 (Ariz. 1996) (distinguishing Whren's facts
from a non-pretextual stop unrelated to traffic violations). The Sullivan court
interpreted these cases as a "[refusal] to give total authority to law enforcement." See
Sullivan II, 340 Ark. at 318-B, 16 S.W.3d at 552.
108. See Leary & Williams, supra note 6, at 1008.
109. See Beck & Daly, supra note 4, at 597. In advocating a new standard, one
commentator dismissed the Whren decision as "a rickety piece ofjudicial scholarship
.... [bluilt upon unreasoned distinctions, perversions of precedent, a question-begging
unarticulated and unsupported premise, bootstrapping, logical inconsistencies, and a
narrow vision ofthe Fourth Amendment." See Leary & Williams, supra note 6, at 1025.
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has abandoned the federal courts to their objective standard," ' and
focused instead on urging state courts to follow Washington in rejecting
Whren as inconsistent with state constitutions."'
Before 2000, the Arkansas Supreme Court considered Whren five
separate times."2 In each case, the court approved of Whren's objective
approach, most often to affirm that a traffic stop is reasonable when an
officer has probable cause to believe that a violation of the law has
occurred." 3 None of these cases squarely presented the issue of pretext,
however; thus, Sullivan represented the court's first opportunity to
review its own precedent in light of Whren's objective test."4
IV. REASONING OF THECOURT
In State v. Sullivan,"' the Arkansas Supreme Court held that Officer
Taylor's search of Kenneth Sullivan's vehicle was notjustified as either
an inventory search or a search incident to arrest, as, under the circum-
stances, the arrest was a pretext to search the vehicle for illicit drugs and
paraphernalia."6  After reviewing additional case law raised in the
State's Petition for Rehearing," ' a divided court affirmed its previous
110. See Leary & Williams, supra note 6, at 1007. The authors observed: "[lit is
now impossible in the federal courts to find a police officer's conduct unconstitutional
on the basis of pretext." See id
I ll. See id. at 1026; Beck & Daly, supra note 4, at 598; Abramovsky & Edelstein,
supra note 104, at 728.
112. See McDaniel v. State, 337 Ark. 431,438,440,990 S.W.2d 515,519-20 (1999)
(holding that search of vehicle was justified by probable cause); Muhammad v. State,
337 Ark. 291,296, 303,988 S.W.2d 17, 19, 23 (1999) (holding that consent search of
vehicle was reasonable); State v. Earl, 333 Ark. 489, 494, 970 S.W.2d 789, 791 (1998)
(holding that officers have probable cause to stop and arrest if a violation of the law is
committed in their presence); Burris v. State, 330 Ark. 66, 71-73,954 S.W.2d 209, 212
(1998) ("[T]he relevant inquiry is whether [the officer] had probable cause to believe
that Burris was committing a traffic offense at the time of the initial stop."); Travis v.
State, 331 Ark. 7, 9-11, 959 S.W.2d 32, 34 (1998) (following Burris).
113. See, e.g., Burris, 330 Ark. at 72, 954 S.W.2d at 213.
114. See, e.g., Travis, 331 Ark. at 9, 959 S.W.2d at 34 (noting that Travis did not
contend that the stop was pretextual).
115. 340 Ark. 315, 11 S.W.3d 526 (2000) ("Sullivan I").
116. See Sullivan I, 340 Ark. at 318, 11 S.W.3d at 527-28. Chief Justice W.H.
"Dub" Arnold wrote for a unanimous court. See id. at 316, I! S.W.3d at 526.
117. See Petition for Rehearing at 2, Sullivan (No. CR 99-1140). In its petition, the
State argued that the United States Supreme Court's opinion in Whren v. United States,
517 U.S. 806 (1996), foreclosed inquiry into the officer's subjective motivations. See




holding that the arrest was pretextual and denied rehearing in a 4-3
supplemental opinion."'
A. The Original Unanimous Opinion
The court began its first opinion by recognizing that the appropriate
standard of review required it to make an independent evaluation of the
totality of the case's circumstances, reversing only if the trial court's
ruling was against the preponderance of the evidence." 9 The court also
noted that the State's only point on appeal asserted that the trial court
erred in granting Mr. Sullivan's motion to suppress the evidence found
in his vehicle. 20
In that light, the court then reviewed the testimony of Officer
Taylor, pointedly observing that he was assigned to the narcotics section
of the police department and was admittedly aware of that section's
information on Mr. Sullivan.' Summarizing Mr. Sullivan's argument
that the circumstances of the arrest itself proved that it was pretextual,
the court repeated his persistent assertion that Officer Taylor had no
reasonable basis to believe that the roofing hatchet was to be used as a
weapon.'
Turning to its own analysis, the court first acknowledged Arkansas
precedent holding that pretext should be determined by the arresting
officer's intent as evidenced by the circumstances of the arrest. " After
briefly noting that the United States Supreme Court specifically forbade
pretextual arrests in a 1932 case,'24 the court then reaffirmed the "but
118. See State v. Sullivan, 340 Ark. 318-A, 16 S.W.3d 551 (2000) ("Sullivan If').
119. See Sullivan 1, 340 Ark. at 317, 11 S.W.3d at 527.
120. See id., I I S.W.3d at 527.
12 1. See id., I I S.W.3d at 527; see also Abstract of Appellant at A-39. Sullivan (No.
CR 99-1140) (holding that the arrest was predicated on Officer Taylor's knowledge of
the narcotics division).
122. See Sullivan I, 340 Ark. at 317, II S.W.3d at 527; see also Brief for Appellee
at 13, Sullivan (No. CR 99-1140). Mr. Sullivan argued that:
The arresting officer had no reasonable basis to believe that the roofing
hammer/hatchet was to be used as a weapon; therefore, the... 'inventory
search' ... was for controlled substances [and it) absolutely illustrates and
proves that the physical arrest was pretextual ... and certainly not for
possessing a roofing hammer/hatchet as a weapon.
Brief for Appellee at 13, Sullivan (No. CR 99-1140).
123. See Sullivan I, 340 Ark. at 317, 11 S.W.3d at 527. The court referred to its
holding in Brenk v. State, 311 Ark. 579, 847 S.W.2d I (1993), which followed
Richardsonv. State, 288 Ark. 407, 706 S.W.2d 363 (1986), and implicitly, Hinesv. State,
289 Ark. 50, 709 S.W.2d 65 (1986). See Brenk. 311 Ark. at 586, 847 S.W.2d at 5; see
also discussion supra Part lII.A.1 .b.
124. See Sullivan I, 340 Ark. at 318, 11 S.W.3d at 527 (citing United States v.
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for" test it had adopted in the 1986 Hines v. State decision.'" The "but
for" approach 126 does not prevent all "dual motive" arrests, the court
explained, but only those arrests which would not have happened at all
but for the officer's pretextual ulterior motive.'
2
Apparently applying the "but for" test, the court expressed its
disbelief that Mr. Sullivan would have been physically arrested for
speeding five miles per hour over the limit and having a corroded
roofing hatchet in his vehicle.12 It thereby implied that the arrest failed
the test, as the court found that it would not have occurred without
Officer Taylor's ulterior motive of searching for contraband.'1' It
bolstered this finding by its observation that the trial court, after
assessing the totality of the circumstances and the credibility of Officer
Taylor, had ruled the arrest to be pretextual.' ° As the circumstances of
each case necessarily determine pretext, the court therefore concluded
it could not hold that the ruling of the trial court was against the
preponderance of the evidence. ' '
Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 467 (1932) ("An arrest may not be used as a pretext to search
for evidence.")).
125. SeeSullivan 1, 340 Ark. at 318, 11 S.W.3d at 527-28 (citing Hines v. State, 289
Ark. 50, 709 S.W.2d 65 (1986)). The court also noted that the Arkansas Court of
Appeals followed the Hines test in Miller v. State, 44 Ark. App. 112, 868 S.W.2d 510
(1993). See Sullivan 1, 340 Ark. at 318, II S.W.3d at 527. In Miller, however, the court
upheld an admittedly pretextual stop, because it found that a"reasonable officer" would
have made the stop despite the pretextual motive. See Miller, 44 Ark. App. at 116, 868
S.W.2d at 512; see also supra note 85 and accompanying text.
126. "[Wlould the arrest not have occurred but for the other, typically, the more
serious crime." Sullivan 1, 340 Ark. at 318, II S.W.3d at 528 (quoting Hines, 289 Ark.
at 55, 709 S.W.2d at 68).
127. See id., I I S.W.3d at 528. The Hines court found this the "correct result," as
described by Professor LaFave in his treatise on criminal procedure. See Hines, 289
Ark. at 55, 709 S.W.2d at 68 (citing WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE § 3.1(d) (1984)).
128. See Sullivan 1, 340 Ark. at 318, II S.W.3d at 528. The court opined: "[T]he
question then becomes whether [Sullivan] would have been arrested simply for
traveling forty miles per hour in a thirty-five mile-per-hour zone and possessing a
roofing hatchet that had clearly been in his vehicle for quite a long time .... We find
that to be doubtful." Id., I I S.W.3d at 528 (emphasis in original).
129. See id., I I S.W.3d at 528.
130. See id, I I S.W.3d at 528. The ruling of the trial court made no mention of
Officer Taylor's credibility, or lack thereof. See Abstract of Appellant at A-39 to A-40,
Sullivan (No. CR 99-1140).
131. See Sullivan 1, 340 Ark. at 318, I1 S.W.3d at 528.
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B. The 4-3 Supplemental Opinion on Denial of Rehearing
In the wake of the court's decision, the State filed a Petition for
Rehearing on February 17, 2000, arguing that the opinion contained a
"significant error of law" contrary to recent United States Supreme
Court precedent." ' In response, on May 18, 2000, a divided court
handed down a supplemental opinion denying the State's petition. 133
1. The Majority Opinion
The court began its supplemental opinion by summarizing the
unusual procedural events leading up to it-specifically, the State's
argument that the original opinion had contained a "significant error of
law."' 34 It also observed that the State had not previously presented this
particular precedent, Whren v. United States.3  In its subsequent
repetition of the State's petition argument, 36 the court arguably recast
it, thus shifting the focus of the inquiry.3
The court rejected this argument, as its reading of Whren would not
support it. 38 Synopsizing the facts of Whren, the court dismissed them
as easily distinguishable from those surrounding Mr. Sullivan's arrest.'39
132. See Petition for Rehearing at 1-3, Sullivan (No. CR 99-1140); see also discussion
supra Part II. The State's Petition for Rehearing argued that the cases the court's
opinion relied upon, Brenk v. State, 311 Ark. 570, 847 S.W.2d 1 (1993). Hines v. State,
289 Ark. 50,709 S.W.2d 65 (1986), and Millerv. State, 44 Ark. App. 112. 868 S.W.2d
510 (1993), were all decided before Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996). See
Petition for Rehearing at 2, Sullivan (No. CR 99-1140). The petition further asserted
that Whren "expressly eliminated the concept of 'pretext' from Fourth Amendment
analysis in cases involving vehicle stops." See id. Thus, the State argued, the court had
applied the wrong standard in its original decision and should grant rehearing to correct
the error. See id. at 3.
133. See Sullivan II, 340 Ark 318-A, 16 S.W.3d 551 (2000). Justices Corbin, Brown
and Thornton joined ChiefJustice Arnold. writing again for the majority, while Justices
Imber and Smith joined Justice Glaze's dissent and would have granted rehearing. See
id. at 318-D, 16 S.W.3d at 553.
134. Seeid. at318-A, 16 S.W.3d at 551.
135. Seeid., 16 S.W.3d at 551.
136. The court summarized the State's argument as: "[U]nder Whren, a police
officer may arrest someone for a minor traffic violation, knowing full well that the real
reason for the arrest is to enable a search of the vehicle for a suspected crime." See id.,
16 S.W.3d at 551.
137. See id., 16 S.W.3d at 55 1. Butsee Petition for Rehearing, Sullivan (No. CR 99-
1140); cf Sullivan II. 340 Ark. at 318-E, 16 S.W.3d at 554 (Glaze, J., dissenting)
(pointing out the incongruity).
138. See Sullivan II, 340 Ark. at 318-A, 16 S.W.3d at 55 1. The court noted: "We
do not read Whren as going as far as the State would have it." See id., 16 S.W.3d at 551.
139. See id. at 318-B, 16S.W.3dat551.
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The court hinged this dissimilarity on its finding that Mr. Sullivan was
"arrested primarily" for the roofing hatchet, as distinct from the fact that
the Whren petitioner's crack cocaine was in plain view. 4" In addition,
it found that Mr. Sullivan was stopped for speeding, in contrast to
"acting suspiciously in a high crime area."' 4' Finally, the court observed
that Officer Taylor conducted a full inventory search following the
arrest, unlike the arrest in Whren, which resulted from the plain view
detection of contraband.
42
The court then turned to the State's contention that Whren fore-
closes inquiry into the ulterior motives of police officers if there is
sufficient probable cause for the initial traffic stop. 43 In doing so, the
court admitted that the Whren decision is "broadly written," but
nevertheless dismissed much of it as dicta, concluding that, in any case,
it will not serve as "blanket authority" for pretextual arrests in all
cases.'" Reiterating its previous holding, the court stated that it must
evaluate the reasonableness of the arrest and subsequent search in each
individual case.
4 5
The court briefly catalogued five state court cases that, it averred,
rejected or limited Whren on either state constitutional grounds or the
unreasonable circumstances of the search and seizure."' It acknowl-
edged that the Arkansas Supreme Court had previously cited Whren in
two cases; 47 however, it rejected their applicability here, as neither of
140. See id. at 318-A to 318-B, 16 S.W.3d at 551-52.
141. See id., 16 S.W.3d at 551-52.
142. See id., 16 S.W.3d at551-52.
143. See id. at 3 18-B, 16 S.W.3d at 552; see also Petition for Rehearing at 3, Sullivan
(No. CR 99-1140) ("Even ifthe officer had an ulterior motive, which the State does not
admit, it is not to be taken into account by this Court, according to Whren, because the
stop was unquestionably proper.").
144. See Sullivan II, 340 Ark. at 318-B, 16 S.W.3d at 552.
145. See id., 16 S.W.3d at 552. To illustrate this point, the court asserted that Whren
would not allow an officer to trail a suspicious driver, waiting for a minor traffic
violation, and then, when the driver exceeded the speed limit by one mile per hour, to
arrest him, thereby validating a full search of the vehicle. See id., 16 S.W.3d at 552.
The dissenting justices agreed with this reading of Whren, but noted, "those are not the
facts before this court." See id. at 318-F, 16 S.W.3d at 555 (Glaze, J., dissenting).
146. See id. at 318-B to 318-C, 16 S.W.3d at 552 (citing State v. Gonzalez-
Gutierrez, 927 P.2d 776 (Ariz. 1996); State v. Varnado, 582 N.W.2d 886 (Minn. 1998);
State v. Holmes, 569 N.W.2d 181 (Minn. 1997); People v. Dickson, 690 N.Y.S.2d 390
(N.Y. App. Div. 1998); State v. Ladson, 979 P.2d 833 (Wash. 1999)); see also
discussion supra Part IlI.C.
147. The court cited Whren in Travis v. State, 331 Ark. 7,959 S.W.2d 32 (1998), and
Burris v. State, 330 Ark. 66, 954 S.W.2d 209 (1997). Interestingly, the court did not




the two cases had presented the issue of pretext.'" The court maintained
that one of the cases, Travis v. State, 49 even noted explicitly that a
pretextual arrest argument had not been proffered before them. 5 °
Next, the court re-emphasized the trial court's ruling that the arrest
had been pretextual and its own belief that Whren would not disallow
such a finding.'5 ' Further, even if it gave Whren a more expansive
reading ("as the State would have it"),'52 the court firmly avowed that it
may nevertheless give the United States Constitution a broader
interpretation than the United States Supreme Court had given it,
effectively providing more rights.'53 In support of this proposition, the
court cited an instance where it had "arguably" already done so: the
Arkansas requirements on night searches are more stringent than those
mandated by the United States Supreme Court."54
Drawing to a close, the court announced that it would not give
"carte blanche" approval for"all pretextual arrests for traffic violations,"
particularly in a case it found so factually distinct from Whren.'"
Echoing its original holding once more, the court avowed that it would
decide the reasonableness of the arrest and search on a case by case
basis, as, it concluded, "the Whren decision makes clear.""
148. See Sullivan II, 340 Ark. at 318-C, 16 S.W.3d at 552.
149. 331 Ark. 7, 959 S.W.2d 32 (1998).
150. See Sullivan I!. 340 Ark. at 318-C, 16 S.W.3d at 552.
151. See id., 16 S.W.3d at 552.
152. See id. at 318-A, 16S.W.3dat551.
153. See id. at 318-C, 16 S.W.3d at 552. Notwithstanding that assertion, it is settled
law that the United StatesSupreme Court is the ultimate authority on the meaning of the
United States Constitution, and may not be overruled. See, e.g., United States v.
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995); Cooper v.
Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) ("[T]he federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of
the law of the [United States] Constitution, and that principle has... been respected
by this Court and the Country as a permanent and indispensable feature of our
constitutional system.") (referring to the seminal decision of Marbury v. Madison, 5
U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803)).
154. See Sullivan !1, 340 Ark. at 318-C, 16 S.W.3d at 552. The court cited ARK. R.
CRIM. P. 13.2(c) (mandating that night warrants may only be issued when the magistrate
has reasonable cause to believe that exceptional circumstances exist) and Garner v.
State, 307 Ark. 353, 820 S.W.2d 446 (1991) (refusing to apply the Leon good faith
exception to an improperly justified night search). See Sullivan II, 340 Ark. at 318-C,
16 S.W.3d at 552.
155. See Sullivan II, 340 Ark. at 318-C, 16 S.W.3d at 552-53 (emphasis in original).
The court summarized: "We draw a clear distinction between arresting a person with
crack cocaine in his hands ... and effecting a pretextual arrest for purposes of a search.
... Surely that flies in the face of reasonableness, which is the essence of the Fourth
Amendment." Id., 16 S.W.3d at 552-53.
156. See id., 16 S.W.3d at 553.
2001] 531
UALR LAW REVIEW
2. The Dissenting Opinion
The dissenting opinion began in agreement with the majority,
noting that although the State had not previously presented Whren before
them, the decision was significant in reaching a correct holding in this
case.'57 Justice Glaze then delineated his disagreements with the
majority, with an emphasis on aspects of the Sullivan arrest that the
majority opinion had omitted.'58 In contrast to the majority, Justice
Glaze stressed the fact that, in addition to speeding and the roofing
hatchet on the floorboard, Mr. Sullivan had no proof of liability
insurance or registration, his speedometer was not functional, and his
windows were incorrectly tinted.'59 Justice Glaze concluded that, under
these circumstances, Officer Taylor clearly had probable cause to stop
Mr. Sullivan for a traffic violation, i.e. speeding and improper tint.' 6°
Accordingly, the dissenters found that the entirely proper stop, resulting
in the discovery of other violations of the law, validated the arrest and
subsequent inventory search of the vehicle.
6'
Justice Glaze then returned to Travis v. State, 6' a case that the
majority opinion had mentioned and dismissed as inapplicable. 63 As
recounted in the dissenting opinion, the Travis court upheld a stop
predicated upon an officer's mistaken belief he had probable cause.'"
Explicitly relying on Whren's objective standard, the Travis court held
it to be well-settled law that an officer may stop and detain a motorist
157. See id., 16 S.W.3d at 553 (Glaze, J., dissenting).
158. See id., 16 S.W.3d at 553 (Glaze, J., dissenting). The dissent also noted the
undisputed evidence that the original stop, for speeding, was proper. See id., 16 S.W.3d
at 553 (Glaze, J., dissenting).
159. See id., 16 S.W.3d at 553 (Glaze, J., dissenting).
160. See Sullivan !1, 340 Ark. at 318-D, 16 S.W.3d at 553 (Glaze, J., dissenting).
161. See id., 16 S.W.3d at 553 (Glaze, J., dissenting). Rule 4.1(a)(iii) of the
Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure permits a law enforcement officer to arrest
without a warrant if the officer has probable cause to believe that a person has
committed any violation of the law in the officer's presence; speeding is a violation of
Arkansas law. See ARK. R.CRIM. P. 4. 1 (a)(iii); ARK. CODE. ANN. § 27-51-201 (c) (Michie
Repl. 1994); see also State v. Earl, 333 Ark. 489, 970 S.W.2d 789 (1998); Hazelwood
v. State, 328 Ark. 602, 945 S.W.2d 365 (1997) (holding that a law enforcement officer
is authorized to arrest persons for minor traffic violations, such as speeding, pursuant
to ARK. R. CRIM. P. 4. 1(a)(iii)). Officer Taylor also followed the Conway Police
Department's Vehicle Inventory Policy during the inventory search. See Abstract of
Appellant at A- 16, Sullivan (No. CR 99-1140).
162. 331 Ark. 7, 959 S.W.2d 32 (1998).
163. See Sullivan II, 340 Ark. at 318-D, 16 S.W.3d at 553 (Glaze, J., dissenting).
164. See id. at 318-E. 16 S.W.3d at 553 (Glaze, J., dissenting); see also supra note
112 and accompanying text. The officer wrongly assumed that Texas license plates
required an expiration sticker. See Travis, 331 Ark. at 9, 959 S.W.2d at 34.
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so long as there is probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has
occurred.'65 Further, the dissenting opinion noted the long-standing rule
requiring the court to liberally review probable cause, thereby implying
that the Sullivan majority had performed an improperly strict review in
addition to ignoring its previous reliance on Whren.'" In light of this
precedent, Justice Glaze returned to his previous conclusion, maintain-
ing that the arrest and search were proper under Arkansas law.'
The dissenting opinion followed this assertion by quarreling with
other aspects of the majority opinion.'68 Disagreeing with the majority's
representation of the State's argument on rehearing, Justice Glaze
quoted from the State's Petition, which contended that "the relevant
inquiry, thus, is... whether the officer had probable cause to believe
that the defendant was committing a traffic offense," and not, as the
majority had suggested, whether the officer may have had an ulterior
motive.'69 In a similar vein, the dissenting opinion also dismissed the
majority's assertion that Mr. Sullivan had been arrested "primarily" due
to the roofing hatchet.' Justice Glaze firmly reiterated that the
appropriate issue was not whether the roofing hatchet alone was cause
enough for an arrest, but rather whether Mr. Sullivan had committed
violations of the law in the officer's presence; Justice Glaze concluded
that, "unquestionably," Mr. Sullivan had done so.'"' Thus, he continued,
according to applicable Arkansas law,'" Mr. Sullivan's arrest was
proper, as was the subsequent inventory search of the vehicle.' 3
165. See Sullivan II, 340 Ark. at 318-E, 16 S.W.3d at 553 (Glaze, J., dissenting).
166. See id., 16 S.W.3d at 554 (Glaze, J., dissenting).
167. See id., 16 S.W.3d at 554 (Glaze, J., dissenting).
168. See id., 16 S.W.3d at 554 (Glaze, J., dissenting).
169. See id., 16 S.W.3d at 554 (Glaze, J., dissenting) (quoting Petition for Rehearing
at 3, Sullivan (No. CR 99-1140)).
170. See id. at 318-E to 318-F, 16 S.W.3d at 554 (Glaze, J., dissenting).
171. See Sullivan !1, 340 Ark. at 318-F, 16 S.W.3d at 554 (Glaze, J., dissenting).
Justice Glaze also conjectured, "it appears that the [trial] judge got off track by
injecting his personal view as to whether a hatchet could be a weapon for which he
could be arrested for possession." See id., 16 S.W.3d at 554 (Glaze, J., dissenting). The
trial judge reflected, "I've got a hammer under the seat of my car today. Am I subject
to being arrested and taken physically into custody because I have a hammer?" See id.,
16 S.W.3d at 554 (Glaze, J., dissenting) (quoting Abstract of Appellant at A-38 to A-
39, SulliYan (No. CR 99-1140)).
172. See sources cited supra note 161.
173. See Sullivan I, 340 Ark. at 318-F, 16 S.W.3d at 554 (Glaze. J., dissenting); see
also ARK. R. CRIM. P. 12.6(b) (providing that a vehicle impounded in consequence of
any arrest may be searched to such extent as is reasonably necessary for safekeeping
of the vehicle and its contents); sources cited supra note 25. The dissenters also noted
that Mr. Sullivan did not prove, nor did the trial court find, that the search was
explicitly pretextual or conducted in bad faith. See Sullivan II, 340 Ark. at 318-G, 16
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According to the dissenting opinion, the majority had held the
initial stop to be proper, finding only the arrest to be pretextual. 74
Justice Glaze repeated his finding that Mr. Sullivan's traffic offenses
justified the arrest, and professed himself to be unaware of any law, nor
of any indication otherwise in the record, that would have required
Officer Taylor to have merely issued a citation in lieu of a physical
arrest.""5 He acknowledged that Officer Taylor had recognized Mr.
Sullivan, after the stop, as a person involved in drug activities, yet
maintained that this fact should not be used to invalidate the arrest,
when many other violations served to justify it.'76
Finally, the dissenters asserted that the United States Supreme
Court's search and seizure jurisprudence would dictate a result contrary
to the majority's holding.177 Condensing the Whren Court's summary of
precedent," Justice Glaze quoted from hren's unanimous rejection of
a subjective test," thus intimating that the majority had improperly
considered Officer Taylor's possible ulterior motives in arresting Mr.
Sullivan.""0
The dissenters would have held that the trial court erred in
suppressing the evidence, and therefore, would overturn its ruling.'
Justice Glaze asserted the majority's contrary holding to be a clear
"departure from search and seizure law," as defined by the United States
Supreme Court.' 2 He concluded with the speculation that the majority's
failure to follow United States Supreme Court precedent "will generate
considerable confusion among the rank and file of law enforcement, the
bench, and the bar alike."' 83
S.W.3d at 554 (Glaze, J., dissenting).
174. See id. at 31 8-G, 16 S.W.3d at 555 (Glaze, J., dissenting).
175. See Sullivan II, 340 Ark. at 318-G, 16 S.W.3d at 555 (Glaze, J., dissenting).
176. See id., 16 S.W.3d at 555 (Glaze, J., dissenting).
177. See id., 16 S.W.3d at 555 (Glaze, J., dissenting).
178. See id., 16 S.W.3d at 555 (Glaze, J., dissenting) (focusing on United States v.
Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579 (1983), and United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S.
218 (1973)).
179. See Sullivan II, 340 Ark. at 318-G, 16 S.W.3d at 555. "We think [among other
cases, Villamonte-Marquez and Robinson] foreclose any argument that the constitutional
reasonableness of traffic stops depends on the actual motivations of the individual
officers involved." Whren, 517 U.S. at 813.
180. See Sullivan II, 340 Ark. at 318-G, 16 S.W.3d at 555 (Glaze, J., dissenting).
181. See id., 16 S.W.3d at 555 (Glaze, J., dissenting).
182. See id., 16 S.W.3d at 555 (Glaze, J., dissenting).




By refusing to allow police officers "carte blanche" authority to use
pretextual seizures as a method of investigation, the Arkansas Supreme
Court has shaken off the specter of federal authority and sent a clear
message to state law enforcement. This accords with the view of many
commentators and the State of Washington,'" who believe that a
subjective test for pretextual seizures is the only acceptable way to
ensure that officers do not "[patrol] far outside the outer boundaries of
the Fourth Amendment."'18
Despite its popularity with legal commentators, this is emphatically
a minority view among courts considering the issue." Courts adopting
the objective test have noted the advantage of allowing officers to
"enforce violations of the law-even minor ones-when they actually
view" them,'87 and the disadvantage of hinging the validity of traffic
stops on "the vagaries of police departments' policies and
procedures.""'8 In addition, the evidentiary difficulty of determining
subjective intent disturbed the Whren Court, likely contributing to its
endorsement of the objective standard.'89
A. The Significance of the Sullivan Standard: Subjective or Objec-
tive?
Despite these problems, in choosing the minority path, the
Arkansas Supreme Court has made it clear that it will not tolerate
pretextual investigatory methods from law enforcement officers.
Unfortunately for those officers-and for the other Arkansans bound to
uphold the law-the method the court will use to determine the presence
of pretext is decidedly less clear. Neither the pre-Whren precedent, nor
the Sullivan decision, effectively delineates the "but for" test. Based on
previous applications of the test, it would appear to be a subjective
standard-despite the mixed messages about the proper focus."9
184. See State v. Ladson, 979 P.2d 833, 837 (Wash. 1999). See also discussion supra
Part lII.D.
185. See United States v. Botero-Ospina, 71 F.3d 783, 792 & n. I (1995) (Seymour,
C.J., dissenting).
186. See discussion supra Part III.C.
187. See Robinson, 2000 WL 893383, at *5.
188. See id.
189. See Whren, 517 U.S. at 814.
190. See discussion supra Part III.A. I .b. It is unclear whether the focus of the "but
for" test should be a "reasonable officer" or the actual arresting officer. See discussion
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Yet, the court has not consistently applied a subjective standard in
all cases involving pretextual seizures. Based on Mings v. State, 9 the
court's most recent pre-Sullivan decision, the proper standard was an
objective one that pre-dated, but paralleled, Whren. 92 To compound the
problem, application of the "but for" test had never resulted in a finding
of pretext until Sullivan, which could indicate that the test was in fact an
objective one.9 '
The Sullivan decision cannot serve to clarify the proper test, as it
merely quotes from earlier decisions rather than examining them."
Further, the opinion merges the court's authority to interpret the state
constitution with a license to interpret the United States Constitution,
effectively blurring the basis for its holding.95 Finally, the court
arguably misinterpreted the Whren decision by dismissing "much of it"
as dicta.'" The most conspicuous error, however, lies in the court's
refusal to clearly delineate whether the Arkansas standard is measured
objectively or subjectively. Until this is clarified, application of the law
is destined to result in contradiction and confusion.
B. The Significance of Sullivan as Precedent: Guthrie and Stephens
Muddy the Waters
Such confusion is apparent in the court's recent decision in State v.
Guthrie,=97 on facts similar to the Sullivan case."8 The only significant
difference between the two was that the trial court in Sullivan specifi-
cally found a pretextual arrest, while in Guthrie, the trial court found an
"unreasonable stop."' 99 In both cases, the State appealed, asserting the
actions were proper under Whren, and in both, the Arkansas Supreme
supra Part Il.B.I.b.
191. 318 Ark. 201, 884 S.W.2d 596(1994).
192. See discussion supra Part lIl.A.1.b. Mings applied an objective test adopted
from the Eighth Circuit. See supra note 185 and accompanying text. The Sullivan
decision clearly overrules Mings, although it neglects even to acknowledge it. See
Sullivan II, 340 Ark. at 318-A to 318-C, I I S.W.3d at 551-52.
193. See supra p. 36 and note 96.
194. See Sullivan I, 340 Ark. at 318, 11 S.W.3d at 527.
195. See Sullivan II, 340 Ark. at 318-C, 16 S.W.3d at 552.
196. See id. at 318-B, 16 S.W.3d at 552.
197. 341 Ark. 624, 19 S.W.3d 10 (2000).
198. Both presented a stop for a minor traffic offense, whereupon both officers
recognized the drivers as involved in criminal activity. See id. at 630-31, 19 S.W.3d at
15 (Glaze, J., dissenting). Both cases also involved the subsequent discovery of
contraband, which both trial courts suppressed. See id., 19 S.W.3d at 15 (Glaze, J.,
dissenting).
199. See id. at 631-32, 19 S.W.3d at 15 (Glaze, J., dissenting).
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Court disagreed. 2' The Guthrie court declined to review the merits of
the appeal, holding that it presented a "run-of-the-mill" probable cause
determination. 2 ' The three Sullivan dissenters dissented again, arguing
that the court was "wrong" to deny the review after its decision in the
"strikingly similar" Sullivan case.0 2 Justice Glaze asserted that the court
should hear the appeal to clarify the "confusing" state of the law in
"these traffic stop-and-arrest situations."203
The court's refusal to use Guthrie as an opportunity to clarify the
state of the law is both striking and significant. The five decisions by
the Arkansas Supreme Court that relied on Whren's objective standard
for traffic stops 2° would seem to indicate that Guthrie merited a reversal,
simply on the facts and the pre-Sullivan law.20" Yet, the Sullivan decision
may have signaled an implicit overruling of that standard in stops as
well as arrests. The court's refusal to elucidate either the Sullivan
holding or the distinction, if any, between stops and arrests is unfortu-
nate, as the Guthrie decision can only lead to further confusion over the
standard defining pretextual seizures.
The court's recent decision in Stephens v. State2" further illustrates
the confusion over the Arkansas standard.0 " Justice Glaze, the dissenter
in Sullivan I, Sullivan II, and Guthrie, wrote for the majority in this case,
holding that because the officer had a valid arrest warrant and the
authority to approach Mr. Stephens under the Arkansas Rules of
Criminal Procedure, the arrest could not be pretextual.2°' In reaching
this conclusion, the court relied on Mings v. State ,21 the 1994 case in
which it had adopted the Eighth Circuit's objective test for determining
200. See id. at 632, 19 S.W.3d at 15 (Glaze, J., dissenting).
201. See id. at 629, 19 S.W.3d at 14. The court found its review was not required,
because the correct and uniform administration of the criminal law was not at issue.
See id., 19 S.W.3d at 14; see also ARK. R. APP. PROC. Rule 3(c).
202. See Guthrie, 341 Ark. at 630, 19 S.W.3d at 15 (Glaze, L., dissenting).
203. See id. at 632, 19 S.W.3d at 16 (Glaze, J., dissenting).
204. See supra pp. 47-48 and note 112.
205. See supra note 127 and accompanying text. The officer in Guthrie observed
traffic violations, which, under prior Arkansas law, would have justified the stop. See
Guthrie, 341 Ark. at 632, 19 S.W.3d at 16 (Glaze, J., dissenting).
206. No. CR 98-1073, 2000 WL 1433628 at *1 (Ark. Sept. 28, 2000).
207. See id. at * I. In Stephens, the defendant was in a car with someone "whom the
policeman knew to be involved in drugs." See id. at * 1. Upon identifying the defendant
as "Mack Stephens," the officer called in a query to the Arkansas Crime Information
Computer, which reported an outstanding warrant for "Mack Stephens." See id. Mr.
Stephens was arrested on this warrant, which was later discovered to have been issued
for his son of the same name. See id.
208. See id. at *2.
209. 318 Ark. 201, 884 Ark. 596 (1994).
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pretext. 2° It did not, however, explicitly declare the Arkansas standard
to be objective, nor did it mention Sullivan. In a concurring opinion,
Justice Brown referred to the "objective and reasonableness standard set
out in Mings," concluding that Sullivan had upheld a "reasonableness
standard." 2"
In sum, Stephens purports to rely on Mings-and, implicitly, its
objective standard-but fails once again to unmistakably identify the
proper test. Although within the context of the facts in Stephens, the
court has undoubtedly applied an objective standard, neither the
majority nor the concurring opinion makes that clear. Furthermore, the
decision is likely to do more harm than good, as the concurring opinion
injects a"reasonable officer" standard-identified with a subjective test,
as in Whren-into an otherwise objective test.'1 2 This mixed focus
demonstrates the key difficulty in this body of Arkansas law, as it
appears that the court has not yet decided what the proper standard
should be. Until it chooses to clarify the issue, there can be no
predictability in pretext cases.
C. The Significance on Writ of Certiorari: Can Sullivan Stand?
If the United States Supreme Court grants writ of certiorari in
Sullivan, the decision is clearly in jeopardy. The United States Supreme
Court has jurisdiction over state court decisions when the face of the
opinion does not demonstrate any possible adequate and independent
state ground for the decision." The Sullivan opinion does not mention
or rely on the Arkansas Constitution."4 Arguably, not even the
precedent it cites has a state law basis. 25 Thus, because Sullivan adopted
210. See id. at *2. See also discussion supra Part III.A.! .b.
211. See id.
212. See id. (Brown, J., concurring). Commentators divide the various approaches
into an objective reasonableness test and a subjective, reasonable officer, "would have"
test. See discussion supra Part III.A. 1.
213. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1040-41(1983). Long instituted a rule
requiring state courts to make a "plain and clear statement" that any use of federal
cases was only for guidance. See id. at 1041. Without such a statement, a state court
decision appearing to rest on federal grounds falls within the United States Supreme
Court's jurisdiction. See id.
214. See State v. Sullivan, 340 Ark. 315, 11 S.W.3d 526, supplemental op. on denial
ofreh'g, 340 Ark. 318-A, 16 S.W.3d 551 (2000), pet. for cert. filed, 69 U.S.L.W. 3157
(U.S. Aug. 16, 2000) (No. 00-262).
215. See id., discussion supra Part IV.A. The Sullivan opinion is analogous to the
Appellate Court of Illinois' decision in Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177 (1990). In
Rodriguez, a consent search case, the Court reversed the lower court's holding that the
search was reasonable. See id. at 189. Because the decision of the Illinois court did not
538 [Vol. 23
PRETEXTUAL SEIZURES
the subjective standard unanimously rejected by the Whren Court, the
Court is likely to reverse Sullivan on writ of certiorari.26
In the final analysis, for Arkansas to maintain its minority path, the
court must explicitly ground its standard in the Arkarsas Constitution.
Arkansas' subjective standard will remain subject to reversal by the
United States Supreme Court unless the court can use future cases to
base its standard on clearly independent and adequate state grounds.
2 7
This may be a difficult task in Arkansas, as-unlike the state of
Washington-it has historically construed the Arkansas Constitution as
analogous to the United States Constitution." 8 Given that the provisions
of the Arkansas Constitution are textually nearly identical to the United
States Constitution, it will be a "vexing problem" to develop interpreta-
tive methods to provide broader rights for Arkansans, while still
maintaining consistency with the parallel federal rights.2 9
contain a "plain statement" that it rested on state law, the Court concluded that it was
based on federal law. See id. at 182. The Court commented: "The opinion does not
rely on (or even mention) any specific provision of the Illinois Constitution, nor even
the Illinois Constitution generally. Even the Illinois cases cited by the opinion rely on
no constitutional provisions other than [the United States Constitution]." See id.
216. See discussion supra Part IV.B. I ; see also discussion supra Part I Il.B. The only
arguable exception to this history is the state's more stringent requirements on night
searches, mentioned in the Sullivan opinion. See Sullivan II, 340 Ark. at 31 8-C, 16
S.W.3d at 552. In the alternative, it is possible that the Court might choose to address
the issues raised by Mr. Sullivan's Brief in Opposition, in particular his contention that
Whren is inapplicable to this pretextual arrest, and it should instead by analyzed in light
of Atwater v. City of Logo Vista, 195 F.3d 242 (5th Cir. 1999), cert. granted, 120 S. Ct.
2715 (June 26, 2000) (No. 99-1408) (argued Dec. 4, 2000). See Brief in Opposition,
Arkansas v. Sullivan (No. 00-262) (Nov. 29, 2000) at 17. This argument attempts to
recast the issues below, distinguishing the stop in Whren from Sullivan's arrest and
asserting that the Fourth Amendment will not allow an officer "unbridled discretion"
to make a custodial arrest for a "non-jailable" traffic violation. See id. at 19-20. The
recast argument, ifaccepted, will fall squarely within the question presented in Atwater,
which has been argued and is awaiting the Court's decision. See Brief of Petitioners,
Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 2000 WL 1299527 at *i (Sept. 11,2000) (No. 99-1408).
It is not at all clear, however, that the Court will accept an argument drawing a Fourth
Amendment distinction between pretextual stops and pretextual arrests. See supra note
60 and accompanying text.
217. See Long, 463 U.S. at 1041.
218. See, e.g., Stout v. State, 320 Ark. 552,557-58, 898 S.W.2d 457,460 (1995); see
also supra note 74 and accompanying text. See also State v. Ladson, 979 P.2d 833, 837
(Wash. 1999); supra note 106 and accompanying text.
219. See Marie L. Garibaldi, The Rehnquist Court and State Constitutional Law, 34
TULSA L.J. 67, 67 (1998). State courts engaged in this challenge must have dual
concerns: (1) how to prevent the state constitution from becoming a "mere shadow" of
the federal constitution; and (2) how to avoid expanding state provisions far beyond
those of the parallel federal provisions. See id.
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Further, in order to develop an independent statejurisprudence, the
court must clarify the basis of its holdings. The ambiguity of Sullivan,
as demonstrated in Guthrie and Stephens, cannot serve pis an adequate
basis to diverge from federal law. Likewise, as a 'more immediate
problem, the decision cannot provide a consistent, predictable basis for
determining the law in Arkansas. The court's refusal to give "carte
blanche" authority to law enforcement for pretextual investigatory
methods may well be a precedent decision that will prove its wisdom in
time. As a first step towards independence, however, it leaves some-
thing to be desired.
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